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Abstract— Many approaches have evolved to enhance 
network attacks detection anomaly using SNMP-MIBs. Most of 
these approaches focus on machine learning algorithms with a 
lot of SNMP-MIB database parameters, which may consume 
most of hardware resources (CPU, memory, and bandwidth). In 
this paper we introduce an efficient detection model to detect 
network attacks anomaly using Lazy.IBk as a machine learning 
classifier and Correlation, and ReliefF as attribute evaluators 
on SNMP-MIB interface parameters. This model achieved 
accurate results (100%) with minimal hardware resources 
consumption. Thus, this model can be adopted in intrusion 
detection system (IDS) to increase its performance and 
efficiency. 
Keywords—Network attacks, SNMP, anomaly detection, 
SNMP-MIB interface parameters. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
       Most of enterprises in the world are connected to the 
internet. These enterprises are actually under the risk of huge 
losses or cessation of functionality due to the cessation of 
their introduced services through the internet. A major 
cessation cause of enterprises internet services is the Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks. DoS attack is a targeted attack on 
server, router, or network to prevent it from servicing the 
legitimate users in a normal manner [1]. In DoS attacks, the 
victim resources are highly consumed by the attacker to 
deprive the legitimate users from being served [2]. 
 
A. Network Attacks  
Many network attacks can be classified as DoS attacks. 
Following are some examples: 
 TCP-SYN flood attack: This attack exploits a 
weakness in TCP handshaking model. In TCP three-
way handshaking model the client sends a SYN 
packet to the server, the server responds with a SYN-
ACK packet to the client, stores the request 
parameters in the memory, and waits for ACK packet. 
In TCP-SYN flood attack, the attacker sends SYN 
request packet to the router with spoofed IP address, 
the router responds with a SYN-ACK packet for the 
spoofed IP and waits for an ACK packet from the 
client that will never reach. The attacker repeats this 
process many times to exhaust the router resources. 
Thus, the router resources will be wasted by allocating 
memory spaces to fake requests. 
 UDP Flood Attack: the attack occurs when the 
attacker sends a numerous packets to random ports in 
the victim computer, the victim in turn, responds to 
these packet with the appropriate ICMP packets. The 
huge traffic of the attack requests and the responses 
will slow down the victim computer bandwidth and 
resources [3].  
 
 ICMP-ECHO Attack: In this attack, the attacker 
sends a huge number of ICMP requests or large 
ICMP packets with spoofed IP address (victim IP 
address) to many nodes in the network, the nodes 
respond to these requests and send the responses to 
the spoofed IP address, the victim. This huge traffic 
will slow down the victim by wasting its resources 
(bandwidth, CPU, memory).  
 
 HTTP Flood Attack: The attacker sends a large 
number of HTTP requests to the victim web server. 
These requests are similar to legitimate requests from 
normal users. The attacker uses botnets to generate 
requests to the victim web server. This attack is 
considered a complicated attack, because it is so 
difficult to distinguish between the attack traffic and 
normal legitimate traffic of users. 
 
 Slowloris Attack: In HTTP protocol, the Get 
message’s header should be completely received 
before the header being processed. If the header is not 
completely received the web server will wait for the 
rest parts of the header presuming that the client has 
a slow internet connection. While of that, the web 
server will keep resources reserved for the http 
session. In Slowloris attack, the attacker will send a 
fake header slowly to the web server to waste the 
server resources for a long time [4]. 
 
 Slowpost Attack: This attacks is similar to the 
Slowloris attack, but with a difference that in 
Slowloris attacks, the web server gets the header 
slowly, and in the Slowpost attack gets the message 
body slowly [5]. 
B. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 
SNMP is a standard protocol emerged in late 1980s [6] to 
manage devices supporting this protocol. Most network 
devices support SNMP, such as routers, switches, modems, 
servers, Uninterruptable Power Supplies (UPS), and more 
[7]. 
SNMP contains variables that describes the traffic passes 
through the device. So, these variables can be monitored to 
characterize the device and the traffic. The analysis of the 
trapped variable from many devices in the network can help 
to detect attacks anomaly [8]. SNMP variables can be 
grouped in the following groups: Interface group (IF), 
Internet Protocol (IP), Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), Address Translation (AT), 
Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP), and SNMP [9]. 
The Management Information Base (MIB) is a database 
of variables related to a device to provide information that is 
specific to that device type [8]. IDS is a network device that 
can stop anomaly network attacks upon traffic analysis.  
 
C. Contribution and Paper Organization 
In [10] author proved that network attacks can be detected 
anomaly using the SNMP-MIB and the proper classifiers. 
They used a dataset with 34 variables categorized into five 
groups (Interface, IP, ICMP, TCP, and UDP). The motivation 
of this paper is to reduce the processes and operations 
performed by the IDS to learn the traffic pattern and classify 
the traffic. Our target is to increase the efficiency and the 
performance, and reduce the required resources for IDS 
anomaly detection. In this paper, we achieved the following 
points: 
 
 Proved that using the SNMP-MIB Interface group 
variables and three machine learning classifiers 
(Lazy.IBk, Random Forest, and Random Tree), an 
accurate and effective detection model can be created 
with accuracy rate of 99.94%. 
 The SNMP-MIB Interface group variables are eight 
variables, instead of using 34 variables.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses the related work in the area of network attacks 
detection anomaly. The proposed model design, and 
evaluation metrics are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, 
the experiment results were discussed and analyzed. Finally, 
the conclusion was illustrated in Section 5. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
     For more than two decades, researchers focused on 
anomaly detection of attacks because of the rapid increase of 
attacks. The anomaly detection can be useful in case of zero-
day attacks. Some anomaly detection of attacks related papers 
will be reviewed in this part. 
 
     In [10] [2] authors, created a realistic dataset with 34 
variables and 4998 records for network anomaly detection. 
This dataset was actually based on SNMP variables collected 
from network devices in test-bed real network. The dataset 
includes 34 variables categorized in 5 groups (Interface, IP, 
ICMP, TCP, and UDP) and 8 network traffic categories 
(Normal traffic, TCP-SYN attack, UDP flood attack, ICMP-
ECHO attack, HTTP flood attack, Slowloris attack, Slowpost 
attack, and Brute-Force attack). Many tools were used to 
generate real attacks like THC-Hydra 5.2, HyenaeFE, 
DOSHTTP 2.5.1, Slowloris script and ActivePerl language, 
and HttpDosTool4.0. Then, three machine learning classifiers 
were used: AdaboostM1, Random Forest, and MLP. 
Following experiment approach was stepped: 
 
 A new SNMP-MIB dataset was created based on 
collected network traffic from real test-bed 
environment. 
 Accurate feature selection methods were used to 
select the most effective variables of the SNMP-MIB 
variables. 
 Machine learning classification methods were 
applied to classify the attack. 
 The MIB variables were classified into 5 groups 
(Interface, IP, ICMP, TCP, and UDP). 
 Each group was classified separately. 
As a result, they found that attacks affect most on 
Interface, and IP groups rather other groups. Other 
conclusion is that each variables group has a different 
classifier with high accuracy that may not give the same 
result with other groups. 
 
In [11] Author proposed a method to detect attacks 
anomaly using three machine learning techniques: BayesNet, 
Multi-Layer perception (MLP), and Support Vector Machine 
(SVM). Then, he used feature selection methods to increase 
his model performance and reduce the computation time. He 
used two feature selection methods with three attribute 
evaluators that are: InfoGain, ReleifF for Filter feature 
selection method, and GeneticSearch for Wrapper feature 
selection method. He introduced an acceptable detection 
accuracy model while reducing the complexity with 99.8% 
accuracy rate in 0.03 second. 
 
Authors in [12] used a ready online repository dataset 
called Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) that 
includes all types of attacks. In this paper they classified the 
attacks into 4 main categories that are DoS, U2R, R2L, and 
PROBE. They followed the following methodology: 
 
 Performing KDD dataset pre-processing. 
 Applying the prepared dataset on a fair environment. 
 Examining all classifiers to find the most accurate 
one in detecting attacks. 
They examined the following classifiers, Random forest, 
Multilayer Perception (MLP), Naïve Bayes, and Bayes 
Network. Finally, it was found that Random Forest classifier 
is the most accurate classifier to detect and classify the attacks 
in KDD dataset into their corresponding categories (DoS, 
U2R, R2L, and PROBE). 
 
Authors in [13] had proposed a new feature selection 
model called Feature Vitality Based Reduction Method 
(FVBRM) based on three feature selectors that are 
Correlation –based Feature Selection (CFS), Information 
Gain (IG), and Gain Ratio (GR). FVBRM provided more 
accuracy than the three attribute selectors with 97.78% 
accuracy ratio. 
In [14] [15] authors compared the performance of some 
machine learning classifiers (Support Vector Machine, 
Random Forest, Logistic Regression and Gaussian Naive 
Bayes), the comparison considered the following metrics 
(Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F-Measure). The 
experiments were conducted on NSL-KDD dataset which is 
the enhanced version of KDD-cup 99. Among the tested 
classifiers, Random Forest performed the others with 
accuracy rate 99%.  
  
In [16] authors evaluated the performance of 4 classifiers 
that are SVM, Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree and Random 
Forest using a big data processing tool network traffic 
intrusion detection called Apache Spark. Their evaluation 
metrics were based on accuracy, building time, and prediction 
time. The experiment was run on UNSW-NB15 dataset that 
has 42 features. It was shown a superiority of Random Forest 
classifier over the others in terms of accuracy, building time, 
and prediction time. 
 
III. RROPOSED MODEL 
      The proposed model performed the most accurate three 
machine learning classifiers on a ready-made SNMP-MIB 
Interface variables to measure the performance and compare 
among these classifiers. Waikato Environment for 
Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) 3.8 tool was used to conduct 
the experiment. Following sections give more details. 
 
A. SNMP-MIB Dataset 
In this work, we adopted the SNMP-MIB dataset from [2] 
to perform the machine learning classification. This SNMP-
MIB dataset is composed of 4998 records for network 
anomaly detection. This dataset was actually based on SNMP 
variables collected from network devices in test-bed real 
network. The dataset includes 34 variables are categorized in 
5 groups (Interface, IP, ICMP, TCP, and UDP) and 8 types of 
network traffic categories (Normal traffic, TCP-SYN attack, 
UDP flood attack, ICMP-ECHO attack, HTTP flood attack, 
Slowloris attack, Slowpost attack, and Brute-Force attack). 
Table1 shows the number of records for each state of data 
traffic. 
TABLE I.  DATA TRAFFIC STATE RECORDS 
No Traffic state (Normal/ Attack type) Records 
1 Normal 600 
2 ICMP-ECHO Attack 632 
3 TCP-SYN Attack 960 
4 UDP Flood Attack 773 
5 HTTP Flood Attack 573 
6 Slowloris Attack 780 
7 Slowpost Attack 480 
8 Brute-Force Attack 200 
 
      SNMP-MIB Dataset variables are categorized in five 
groups as in Table2. 
TABLE II.  SNMP-MIB VARIABLES AND CATEGORIES [2] 
Interface 
Group IP Group 
ICMP 
Group 
TCP 
Group 
UDP 
Group 
ifInOctets ipInReceives icmpInMsgs 
tcpOutRst
s 
udpInDatag
rams 
ifOutOctet
s ipInDelivers 
icmpInDes
tUnreachs tcpInSegs 
udpOutDat
agrams 
ifoutDisca
rds ipOutRequests 
icmpOutM
sgs 
tcpOutSe
gs 
udpInError
s 
ifInUcastP
kts ipOutDiscards 
icmpOutD
estUnreac
hs 
tcpPassiv
eOpens 
udpNoPort
s 
ifInNUcas
tPkts ipInDiscards 
icmpInEch
os 
tcpRetran
sSegs  
ifInDiscar
ds 
ipForwDatagr
ams 
icmpOutE
choReps 
tcpCurrEs
tab  
ifOutUcas
tPkts 
ipOutNoRoute
s  
tcpEstabR
esets  
ifOutNUc
astPkts 
ipInAddrError
s  
tcpActive
Opens  
 
This model depends on SNMP-MIB interface variables to 
detect attacks anomaly. In Table3 a brief description for each 
interface variable. 
TABLE III.  INTERFACE VARIABLE DISCRIPTION 
Label Variable Name Variable description 
1 ifInOctets The total number of octets received on the interface. 
2 ifOutOctets The total number of octets transmitted out of the interface 
3 ifoutDiscards 
The number of outbound packets 
which were chosen to be discarded 
even though no errors had been 
detected to prevent their being 
transmitted 
4 ifInUcastPkts 
The number of packets, delivered 
by this sub-layer to a higher (sub-) 
layer, which were not addressed to 
a multicast or broadcast address at 
this sub-layer. 
5 ifInNUcastPkts 
The number of packets, delivered 
by this sub-layer to a higher (sub-
)layer, which were addressed to a 
multicast or broadcast address at 
this sub-layer 
6 ifInDiscards 
The number of inbound packets 
which were chosen to be discarded 
even though no errors had been 
detected to prevent their being 
deliverable to a higher-layer 
protocol 
7 ifOutUcastPkts 
The total number of packets that 
higher-level protocols requested be 
transmitted, and which were not 
addressed to a multicast or 
broadcast address at this sub-layer 
8 ifOutNUcastPkts 
The total number of packets that 
higher-level protocols requested be 
transmitted, and which were 
addressed to a multicast or 
broadcast address at this sub-
layer, including those that were 
discarded or not sent 
 
B. Machine Learning Classifiers 
Machine learning classifiers are algorithms that 
understand the dataset, and make predictions [17]. Classifier 
uses the SNMP-MIB dataset records to train and build 
classification model. Using the classifier, the model can 
classify new objects with high accuracy. As mentioned 
before, top three classifiers are used in building the model. 
These classifiers are illustrated as following. 
 
Lazy.IBk machine learning algorithms store the training 
instances and do nothing until classification is triggered. Lazy 
learning is a learning method in which generalization beyond 
the training data is delayed until a query is made to the system 
where the system tries to generalize the training data before 
receiving queries [18]. 
 
Random Committee classifier Builds an ensemble of base 
classifiers and averages their predictions. Each one is based 
on the same data, but uses a different random number seed 
[19]. 
 
Random Forest classifier was introduced in 2000’s by Leo 
Breiman which combines with a set of decision trees that 
grow by selecting random subspaces of dataset [20]. 
 
C. Feature Selection 
Feature selection is a method to find the most related 
features (attributes) that may increase the accuracy, and 
efficiency of classification with minimal amount of hardware 
resource consumption in terms of memory, CPU, and 
bandwidth. 
In this model, all attribute evaluators provided by WEKA 
tool are implemented on the interface group variables. The 
first top 5, and 3 results of each evaluator were taken as input 
to the top 3 classifiers to classify the dataset records again 
based on these 5, and 3 features. 
 
D. Evaluation Metrics 
In this paper, most used measurement metrics had been 
adopted, that are, Precision and F-Measure. 
Precision is ratio of correctly predicted positive samples 
to all predicted positive samples, where Recall is the 
ratio of correctly predicted positive samples to the total 
number of real positive samples. F-Measure takes in its 
consideration the two previous metrics as in the follows 
formulas: 
 
 
………(1) 
 
……...(2) 
 
 
……..(3) 
 
IV. EXPERMINTAL RESULTS 
      In this experiment all classifiers (43 classifiers) were 
applied on the interface variables dataset to choose the most 
three accurate classifiers. From Table 5, the most three 
accurate classifiers were Lazy.IBk (LI), 
meta.RandomCommittee (RC), and trees.RandomForest 
(RF). 
TABLE IV.  CLASSIFIERS RESULTS 
No. Classifier 
Correctly 
Classified 
Instances 
Rate (%) 
1 lazy.IBk 99.94 
2 meta.RandomCommittee 99.9 
3 trees.RandomForest 99.9 
4 meta.RandomSubSpace 99.8599 
5 trees.RandomTree 99.8399 
6 rules.PART 99.6999 
7 meta.ClassificationViaRegression 99.6799 
8 meta.AttributeSelectedClassifier 99.6399 
9 trees.J48 99.5998 
10 meta.Bagging 99.5798 
11 trees.REPTree 99.4798 
12 bayes.BayesNet 99.3798 
13 meta.FilteredClassifier 99.3597 
14 rules.JRip 99.2797 
15 trees.LMT 98.0392 
16 meta.IterativeClassifierOptimizer 97.8191 
17 meta.LogitBoost 97.8191 
18 functions.MultilayerPerceptron 97.2789 
19 rules.DecisionTable 96.9588 
 
      The following Fig. 6, 7 show the performance results of 
F-Measure and Precision of the three classifiers on all 
interface variables dataset. All three classifiers performed 
100% in classifying Slowpost and Brute force traffic. 
Lazy.IBk performed better than others in classifying normal 
traffic.  
 
Fig. 1: F-Measure Results for Adopted Classifiers 
 
 
Fig. 2: Precision Results for Adopted Classifiers 
 
       In this paper, all attribute evaluators are implemented on 
the interface group variables as in Table 5. The first top 5, 
and 3 results of each evaluator were taken as input to the top 
3 classifiers to classify attacks again based on these 5, and 3 
attributes. High accurate results in classification means a 
good attribute evaluation. Most accurate attribute evaluators 
were InfoGain, ReliefF, and Correlation, when used with 
Lazy.IBk classifier with a rate of 100% Correctly Classified 
Instances. InfoGain, ReliefF, and Correlation attribute 
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evaluators had selected the same attributes that are 2, 4, 5, 7, 
and 8. 
TABLE V.  ATTRIBUTE EVALUATORS RESULTS 
No Attribute Evaluator  
Top 5 
attribute
s 
Classifier 
Correctly 
Classified 
Instances Rate 
Top 5 Top 3 
1 InfoGain 8,7,4,5,2 LI 100% 99.98 
 2 InfoGain 8,7,4,5, 2 RC 99.9% 99.92 
3 InfoGain 8,7, 4,5,2 RF 99.94% 99.96 
 4 Correlation 4,8,5,7,2 LI 100% 100 
5 Correlation 4,8,5,7,2 RC 99.9% 99.88 
6 Correlation 4,8,5,7,2 RF 99.94% 99.94 
7 CfsSubsetEval 2,3,4,7,8 LI 99.98% 
99.4798 
8 CfsSubsetEval 2,3,4,7,8 RC 99.88% 
98.4994 
9 CfsSubsetEval 2,3,4,7,8 RF 99.92% 
98.8996 
10 ReliefF 5,8,4,7,2 LI 100% 100 
11 ReliefF 5,8,4,7,2 RC 99.9% 99.88 
12 ReliefF 5,8,4,7,2 RF 99.94% 99.94 
13 ClassifierAttributeEval 8,7,2,3,4 LI 99.98% 
99.96 
14 ClassifierAttributeEval 8,7,2,3,4 RC 99.88% 
99.94 
15 ClassifierAttributeEval 8,7,2,3,4 RF 99.92% 
99.96 
 
    The following Fig. 8, 9 show the performance results (F-
Measure and Precision) for the three classifiers on top 5 
interface attributes. 
 
 
Fig. 3:F-Measure Results (Top 5 Attributes) 
 
 
Fig. 4:Precision Results (Top 5 Attributes) 
 
     As in Table 5, best correctly classified instances rate were 
for InfoGain, Correlation, and ReliefF attribute evaluators 
with Lazy.IBk classifier with result 99.98%, 100%, and 100% 
respectively. InfoGain selected the attributes 8, 7, and 4 as 
most related attributes. Both Correlation, and ReliefF 
selected the attributes 5, 8, and 4 as most related attributes. 
The results in Fig. 10,11,12,13 indicate that Lazy.IBk 
classifier achieved high performance 100% with most three 
related attributes in classifying all attacks in the dataset. 
Another point, attributes selected from Correlation, and 
ReliefF had given higher precision, and F-Measure results 
more than attributes selected by InfoGain. 
 
Fig. 5: Precision Results (3 Attributes by InfoGain) 
 
 
Fig. 6:F-Measure Results (3 Attributes by InfoGain) 
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Fig. 7: Precision (3 Attributes by Correlator and ReleifF) 
 
 
Fig. 8: F-Measure (3 Attributes by Correlator and ReleifF) 
V. CONCLUSION 
      In this paper, SNMP-MIB interface features have been 
exploited to detect brute-force, and DoS attacks anomaly. 
Machine learning algorithms had been used to learn dataset 
records and predict the matching attack. There was a variance 
in machine learning classifiers’ performance in terms of 
precision and F-Measure metrics. The most appropriate 
classifiers to classify attacks using interface variables were 
Lazy.IBk, meta.RandomCommittee, and trees.RandomForest 
that gave high accurate results. Attribute evaluators had been 
used to select the most effective 5, and 3 attributes to 
minimize the number of attributes processed by the classifier, 
and then to reduce the allocated resources in real IDS devices 
to detect attacks anomaly. The most accurate attribute 
evaluators were Correlator, and ReliefF, that when used with 
Lazy.IBk classifier on interface parameters give 100% 
accurate results. 
      Finally, applying Correlator, and ReliefF attribute 
evaluators, and Lazy.IBk machine learning classifier in IDS 
will increase the performance, and accuracy of IDS 
functionality with minimum hardware resources 
consumption (CPU, memory, and bandwidth). 
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